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Abstract 
Compensation Strategy is seen as one of the most important strategies in the human resource management 
function as it influences the productivity and growth of an organization. Recently, numerous special journal 
issues have emerged on compensation, often focusing on organization differences. Examples include: the "New 
Economics of Personnel" (Journal of Labor Economics, October 1997), "The Economics of Human Resource 
Management", (Industrial Relations, Spring 1998) and "Do Compensation Policies Matter? An Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, February 1990). The Brookings Institution (Blinder, 1990) has also published series of 
papers by scholars in the management field that reviewed the effectiveness of pay programs such as profit 
sharing, employee ownership, and so forth. Despite these research efforts, there is little debate about whether 
employees’ pay has any significant linkage with performance. (see also Gerhart and Milkovich ,1990). Thus, in 
the present study, we tried to link compensation with performance using selected firms in Nigeria as a case 
study. We specifically covered three conglomerates in Nigeria. The choice of this case study was not 
unconnected with the fact that these companies are among the largest employers of labour in the manufacturing 
industry in Nigeria. Using the cross-sectional data analysis, we found that compensation strategy has the 
potential beneficial effects of enhancing workers’ productivity and by extension improving the overall 
organizational performance. Therefore, the significance of compensation cannot be overemphasized in an 
organization and is in fact a veritable option for attracting, retaining, and motivating employees for improved 
organizational productivity. This finding further enriches the literature supporting that a higher pay guarantees a 
higher productivity and vice-versa. 




In any profit-oriented organization, employment relationship is seen as an exchange process where employees 
provide inputs in terms of skills and expertise in return for various compensations from the employer. From the 
perspective of the employee, pay has an important influence on Standard of living, status, and security. Less 
direct forms of compensation such as health care, pensions and other benefits also have an important impact on 
employees' well-being. From the employer’s point of view, compensation is both a major cost of doing business 
that needs to be controlled, and an investment that must generate adequate returns in terms of employee attitudes, 
skills, behaviors, and organization performance.  
In the present research work, we survey some of the research evidence on compensation and performance. 
In particular, we provide a comprehensive review of the measurement, determinants, and consequences 
(including performance) of compensation decisions. The fact that employment relationships or contracts are 
often of a long-term nature reinforces the importance of such issues. 
Compensation is often regarded as direct and indirect monetary and non-monetary rewards given to 
employees on the basis of the value of the job, their personal contributions, and their performance. These 
rewards must meet both the organization's ability to pay and any governing legal regulations. 
The growing recognition and consensus that compensation promotes productivity is consistent with the 
early work of Peter Drucker (1956) that states “happy workers are productive workers.” Recently, numerous 
special journal issues have emerged on compensation, often focusing on organization differences. Examples 
include: the "New Economics of Personnel" Journal of Labor Economics, October 1997), "The Economics of 
Human Resource Management", (Industrial Relations, Spring 1998) and "Do Compensation Policies Matter? An 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, February 1990). The Brookings Institution (Blinder, 1990) also 
published series of papers by scholars in the management field that reviewed the effectiveness of pay programs 
such as profit sharing, employee ownership, and so forth. (see Gerhart and Milkovich ,1990) 
 A report on pay for performance published by the National Academy of Sciences (Milkovich and Wigdor, 
1991) places a good deal of emphasis on the importance of organization differences in studying pay. Hartmann, 
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Roos, and Treiman's (1985) basic research agenda emphasized the "need to understand better how wages are set 
within enterprises. There is little debate about whether employees’ pay has any significant linkage with 
performance. (see also Gerhart and Milkovich ,1990) 
 
2.0 Purpose And Significant Of Study 
The broad objective of this study, therefore, is to examine critically and empirically, the impacts of 
compensation strategy on corporate performance using some selected firms in Nigeria as a case study. 
The specific objectives, however, include: 
(i) To analyze the nature and structure of compensation strategy in a corporate organization. 
(ii) To examine the implications of compensations to both the employees and the employers. 
(iii) To provide theoretical explanations and empirical validations for the linkage between compensation and 
performance. 
Researchers particularly those in the field of business finance and economics have grown increasingly 
interested in the theory of the firm in recent years. These efforts have focused on the relations between markets 
and hierarchies, the influence of organization-specific assets, corporate governance systems, and the agency 
problems caused by conflicts of interest among the contracting parties that make up the firm. One of the more 
important, but least analyzed, factors affecting organizational behavior is the internal incentive structure which 
includes the management of human resources in general and compensation policies in particular. A thorough 
understanding of internal incentives is critical to developing a viable theory of the firm, since they largely 
determine how individuals behave in organizations. This is the research gap the present study intends to fill. 
Of course, there has been an enormous amount of research in the business finance and economics of 
contracting, but this increasingly technical research has generated few empirical implications, and offers little 
guidance in understanding actual compensation arrangements particularly in large organizations. There are many 
common and important features of organizational incentive systems that contemporary researchers have not 
studied extensively including pay systems that are largely independent of performance, the overwhelming use of 
promotion-based incentive systems, egalitarian pay systems apparently motivated by horizontal equity 
considerations, the asymmetric effects of rewards and punishments, seniority-based pay systems, profit sharing, 
the generally rare observation of bonding and up-front entry fees for jobs, and the general reluctance of 
employers to fire, penalize, or give poor performance evaluations to employees. In the present research work, we 
discuss some of these features and their implications in an organization.  
Following this background, the remaining sections of the study are structured thus: Section two presents a 
comprehensive review of literature; Section three deals with the methodology employed; Section four involves 
analysis of research findings and section five for summary, conclusions and recommendations.  
 
3.0 Literature Review 
Theories of compensation generally assume that higher performance requires greater effort or that it is in some 
other way associated with disutility on the part of workers. In order to provide incentives, these theories predict 
the existence of reward systems that structure compensation so that a worker’s expected utility increases with 
observed productivity. These rewards can take many different forms, including praise from superiors and 
co-workers, implicit promises of future promotion opportunities, feelings of self-esteem that come from superior 
achievement and recognition, and current and future cash rewards related to performance. Analysts, while 
recognizing that non-monetary rewards for performance can be important, tend to focus on monetary rewards 
because individuals are willing to substitute non-monetary for monetary rewards and because money represents a 
generalized claim on resources and is therefore in general preferred over an equal dollar-value payment in kind. 
Evidence from research on compensation plans indicates that explicit financial rewards in the form of transitory 
performance-based bonuses seldom account for an important part of a worker’s compensation.  Medoff and 
Abraham (1980), who examine the pay of managerial and professional employees in two large manufacturing 
firms, find little differences in earnings resulting from superior performance.  
Lawler (1971, p. 158) cites six separate studies of the relationship between pay and performance, and finds 
that “their evidence indicates that pay is not very closely related to performance in many organizations that claim 
to have merit increase salary systems. The studies suggest that many business organizations do not do a very 
good job of tying pay to performance. This conclusion is rather surprising in light of many companies’ very 
frequent claims that their pay systems are based on merit. It is particularly surprising that pay does not seem to 
be related to performance at the managerial level. Thus, the Medoff and Abraham evidence seems to be 
indicative of general performance measurement and compensation systems, and we have no thorough 
understanding of the forces responsible for these practices. 
The potential benefits of tying pay to performance are obvious, and it is surprising to researchers that firms 
apparently resist introducing bonus-based compensation plans with enough financial “action” to have a major 
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motivational effect. One explanation for the lack of pay-for-performance plans, offered primarily by 
psychologists and behaviorists, is that monetary rewards are counter-productive. Deci (1972) argues that money 
actually lowers employee motivation, by reducing the “intrinsic rewards” that an employee receives from the 
job. Similarly, Slater (1980) concludes that “Getting people to chase money produces nothing but people chasing 
money. Using money as a motivator leads to a progressive degradation in the quality of everything produced.” 
Kohn (1988) in his article “Incentives Can Be Bad for Business,” offers three reasons why merit-pay systems are 
counterproductive. “First, rewards encourage people to focus narrowly on a task, to do it as quickly as possible, 
and to take few risks. Second, extrinsic rewards can erode intrinsic interest. Finally, people come to see 
themselves as being controlled by a reward.” 
A second group of merit-pay critics argue that, while financial incentive schemes improve productivity in 
principle; in practice they induce significant adverse side effects that are costly to employee morale and 
productivity. The costs of dealing with many of the problems induced by merit systems simply outweigh the 
limited organizational benefits they offer. Among the side effects often mentioned are horizontal equity 
concerns, and problems associated with imperfect performance measurement. Hamner (1975) in his article “How 
to Ruin Motivation with Pay” argues that merit systems decrease motivation because managers systematically 
mismanage pay-for-performance programs. Personnel executives often espouse the virtues of horizontal equity 
systems, which treat employees at the same level in an organization “fairly” and “equally.” Aggressive 
pay-for-performance systems ultimately involve distinguishing workers on the basis of their performance, and 
there is a large behavioral literature arguing that treating employees differently from each other is detrimental to 
employee morale. The notion is that a worker will “feel badly” if a co-worker gets a bigger bonus, and the net 
effect of this inequity is to reduce morale and ultimately productivity. It’s difficult to provide an economic 
explanation for why horizontal equity is desirable, and yet it seems to be a powerful force that drives firms 
towards consistency of pay within job type, and even across job type when employees are viewed as being of 
“comparable worth.” Pay scales throughout much of corporate America are determined by “job evaluation 
systems,” which “stem from the need to establish internal pay equity” (Risher 1978, p. 24). Such plans set wage 
levels by conducting surveys within and across organizations to assess the “value of a job” according to a set of 
criteria such as the amount of training and education required, the total budget involved, the number of people 
supervised, and the amount of “independent decision-making” the job entails. Traditional economic analysts, 
however, would indicate these variables are important only to the extent that they affect the opportunity cost of 
the relevant quality worker and the salary level that determines the optimal turnover rate. We believe that careful 
examination of the criticisms of monetary pay-for- performance systems indicates not that they are ineffective 
but rather that they are too effective: strong pay-for-performance motivates people to do exactly what they are 
told to do. Large monetary incentives generate unintended and sometimes counterproductive results because it is 
difficult to adequately specify exactly what people should do and therefore how their performance should be 
measured. Moreover, merit-pay systems encourage employees to spend effort lobbying about both the 
specification and application of the system to measure and evaluate output.  
Compensations are also tied to job levels in the firm and not to individuals; most of the average increases in 
an employee’s compensation can be traced to promotions and not to continued service in a particular position. 
Medoff and Abraham (1980), for example, find that between-job-level earnings differentials are more important 
than within-job-level differentials.  
Promotions in organizations serve two important and distinct purposes. First, individuals differ in their 
skills and abilities, jobs differ in the demands they place on individuals, and promotions are a way to match 
individuals to the jobs for which they’re best suited. This matching process occurs over time through promotions 
as employees accumulate human capital and as more information is generated and collected about the 
employee’s talents and capabilities. A second role of promotions is to provide incentives for lower level 
employees who value the pay and prestige associated with a higher rank in the organization. 
Promotions are used as the primary incentive device in most organizations, including corporations, 
partnerships, and universities. The empirical importance of promotion-based incentives, combined with the 
virtual absence of pay-for-performance compensation policies, suggests that providing incentives through 
promotion opportunities must be less costly or more effective than providing incentives through transitory 
financial bonuses. This prediction is puzzling to us because promotion-based incentive schemes appear to have 
many disadvantages and few advantages relative to bonus-based incentive schemes. 
The incentives generated by promotion opportunities, for example, depend on the probability of promotion 
which in turn depends on the identity and expected horizon of the incumbent superior. Promoting a young 
employee with a long expected horizon in the job commonly diminishes the incentives of the employee’s former 
co-workers who now expect to wait a long time until their next promotion opportunity. Promotion incentives are 
reduced for employees who have been passed up for promotion previously and whose future promotion potential 
is doubtful, and incentives will be absent for employees who clearly fall short of the promotion standard or who 
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cannot conceivably win a promotion. In addition, promotion possibilities provide no incentives for anyone to 
exceed the standard or to substantially outperform his or her coworkers. 
Another important problem with promotion-based reward systems is that they require organizational growth 
to feed the reward system. This means such systems can work well in rapidly growing firms, but are likely to 
generate problems in slowly growing or shrinking firms. Jensen (1986a; 1986b) argues that, in slowly growing 
firms with free cash flow, promotion-based reward systems encourage managers to spend resources on 
unprofitable growth rather than paying out excess cash to shareholders.  
Bonus-based incentives, transitory in the sense that this year’s bonus depends on this year’s performance, 
do not have the problems associated with promotion-based incentives. Bonus schemes can, in principal, provide 
incentives for all individuals in the organization, regardless of their ability, position, and promotion 
opportunities. For example, properly structured compensation policies at all levels in the organization can punish 
top executives for unprofitable expansion without degrading incentives for lower level managers.  
Bonus-based incentives will be more important at higher levels in the organization since the probability of 
future promotion is lower; the CEO is not promotable and therefore his or her financial incentives must come 
from bonuses. Promotion-based schemes will be used more in large organizations with many hierarchical levels 
than in smaller organizations with fewer levels. In addition, promotion-based reward systems will be more 
prevalent in growing industries (because there are more new jobs to feed the reward system), while bonus-based 
systems will be more prevalent in declining industries. 
Other forms of compensation systems include Profit Sharing, Gain Sharing. Under profit-sharing, payouts 
are based on organization-wide profits. The plan has two potential advantages. First, it may provide an incentive 
for employees to act in the best interests of the organization, rather than pursuing narrower goals. Second, by 
making a portion of compensation vary with organization profits, an organization can align its labor costs more 
closely with its ability to pay. Thus, during business downturns, it has fewer fixed labor costs. Weitzman and 
Kruse (1990) have provided a comprehensive review of profit-sharing research. Based on previous attitude 
surveys, they concluded that both employees and employers believe that profit-sharing has positive effects on 
organization performance. Further, they found consistent evidence of statistically significant and positive links 
between profit-sharing and organization performance, usually defined as value added. Nevertheless, Gerhart and 
Milkovich (1990) raised some issues that might temper the positive evaluation reached by Weitzman and Kruse. 
As one example, the use of value added as a dependent variable carries potential risks because it is not a measure 
of physical productivity. Instead, it is defined as the degree to which the price of a product exceeds the cost of 
factor inputs (e.g., labor). Obviously, the price of a product can be influenced by factors other than productivity. 
Weitzman and Kruse seem to recognize this and other potential problems with the profit-sharing literature. They 
note that "A limitation of the econometric studies is that they shed little light on the mechanisms through which 
profit sharing may affect productivity" (p. 139). The reason for interpreting the profit-sharing research cautiously 
is that there are both conceptual problems and roadblocks that have arisen in practice. For example, from a 
motivational point of view, it is not clear that any single employee will see much link between his or her 
performance and the organization profits because of the large number of people and factors that influence profits 
(i.e., "line of sight" problem). This, together with the “free rider” problem suggests that the motivational effect of 
such a plan may be limited. 
In addition, the attempt to make labor costs vary with business conditions has also not worked out in a 
number of cases. Employees often think profit-sharing is fine when profits are good because the profit-sharing 
payments are just "gravy." However, when profits go down and their pay goes down, serious opposition can 
arise and plans may be scrapped. It is also possible that the introduction of this sort of risk into employee pay 
packages may require a compensating wage differential (Abowd & Ashenfelter, 1981). Otherwise, employees 
may gravitate toward organizations that do not require them to bear such risks.  
Steven et.al (2011) investigates the relationship between firm strategy and the use of performance measures 
in executive compensation. Their analysis shows that there is an increased emphasis on sales in the 
determination of executive compensation for firms pursuing a cost leadership strategy in order to attain 
competitive advantage through low price and high volume while there is a decreased emphasis on accounting 
measures in firms pursuing a differentiation strategy, which require investments in brand recognition and 
innovative products, investments that are subject to unfavourable accounting treatment. These results indicate 
that compensation committees link executive rewards to firm strategy. 
In contrast to the typical profit-sharing plan, gain sharing payouts are (a) typically linked to group or plant 
rather than organization-wide performance, (b) based on productivity rather than profits, and (c) distributed more 
frequently and not deferred. Taken together, these differences suggest a greater motivational impact for gain 
sharing because a payout criterion like group or plant productivity is likely to be seen as more controllable by 
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4.0 Research Methodology  
Research Approach 
This study involves largely the use of primary data for purpose of empirical analysis. The primary data were 
obtained with the use of structured questionnaires and selected interviews. The questions were structured in such 
a way as to provide pertinent information on the impact of compensation strategy on organizational performance. 
These questions were made simple and straight forward in order to ensure maximum responses from the 
respondents. For the questionnaire, we have both the open-ended and close–ended questions. The close-ended 
questions are restrictive and in fact limit the responses of the respondents to “YES” or ”NO” and the Likert scale 
of “Strongly Agree (SA)”, “Agree (A)” “Uncertain(UC)”, “Disagree ( D)”, and “Strongly Disagree (SD)”. 
The open-ended questions, however, allow the respondents to express their opinions on some specific 
issues.  
Interviews were equally conducted with some key persons namely; staff and management of selected 
business units. This enables us obtain a balanced picture regarding the significance of compensation strategy on 
employees productivity and organizational performance. It also alleviates the probable incidence of bias as well 
as ensures reliability of the results.  
Research Method 
This study specifically covers three conglomerates in Nigeria. The choice of this case study is not unconnected 
with the fact that these companies are among the largest employers of labour in the manufacturing industry in 
Nigeria. A total number of 150 questionnaires (50 for each company) were considered. The questionnaires were 
distributed among the staff and management of the selected business units. The random sampling technique was 
employed in the distribution of the questionnaires. This implies that every member found eligible stands the 
chance of being selected until the required sample size is obtained. For the purpose of data analysis, the likert 
scale responses were coded appropriately. Meanwhile, the collected data were analyzed with use of both 
descriptive and quantitative techniques.  
The testable research hypotheses include: 
1. H0: Compensation strategy has no significant effects on Employees’ Productivity. 
2. H0: Compensation strategy has no significant effects on Organizational Performance. 
In testing these research hypotheses, we specified a model, which follows closely the idea conveyed in the works 
of Butler et al (1997), and Butler and Gardner (1994). Butler et al (1997), and Butler and Gardner (1994) have 
tested the hypothesis that managers partly get rid of their low productivity workers through the workers’ 
compensation program. The model equations specified for this study include:  
1i iy x uα β ′= + +        (1) 
2i iy x vδ β ′= + +              (2) 
 1,..., .i N=  
Where i represents the cross-section units; 1iy is Employees’ Productivity; 2iy , organizational performance 
and x for compensation strategy.  ,  and α β δ  represent the model parameters while  and u v  the 
disturbances.              
In relation to the a priori relationship between the dependent and the independent variables, a positive 
relationship is expected between compensation strategy and employees’ productivity and organizational 
performance.  The model was estimated using the multiple choices model approach.  
 
5.0 Data Presentation And Analysis  
Analysis of Selected Project Related Questions  
Table 1 in appendix revealed respondents’ view to company’s compensation strategy   and it indicates that 
10% of the respondents have regular appraisal for promotion 3% enjoy gifts/bonuses as compensation for 
outstanding performance 7% for regular increases 70% for improved working environment and 10% for more 
than one of the compensation strategies highlighted.  
All the administered respondents were of the view that their company’s compensation strategy is inadequate 
while compensation is a veritable option for enhancing productivity.  Majority of the administered respondents 
acknowledged that though the compensation is not adequate they still look forward to it in the course of 
executing their official duties. (See table 2)  
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Table 3 reveals that all the respondents confirmed the existence of formal laws guiding labour working 
environment. Although all the respondents confirmed the existence of labour laws they however revealed that 
their employers seldom respect these laws for improved labour protection. 
Majority of the respondents strongly disagreed that compensation strategy is not cost effective. They were 
of the opinion that compensation generates more incomes than the cost incurred on it and that there are 
alternatives to the popular pay for performance system of compensation in Nigeria. While majority of the 
respondents opined that their companies follow the implementation of the adopted compensation strategy to the 
letter even though it is not sufficient. (See table 2) 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
The results obtained from the regression analyses are resented below: 
Effect of compensation strategy on workers’ productivity 
Dependent variable: 
1iy  
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Constant 0.261 1.015 
ix  0.783 2.98* 
Source: From Authors’ Computation 2011  
*→Significant at 5 percent level. 
The estimation results as presented in table above reveal that compensation is a critical factor influencing 
workers’ productivity. Specifically, the t-statistic indicates that compensation has statistically significant positive 
impact on workers’ productivity. The slope value of 0.783 means that for a unit change in compensation, on the 
average, the probability of having improved/enhanced worker’ productivity increases by 0.783.   
 
Effect of compensation strategy on organisational performance 
Dependent variable: 
2iy  
Variable  Coefficient  T-Stat. 
Constant -0.354 -1.369 
ix  0.415 3.721* 
Source: From Authors’ Computation 2011 
*→Significant at 1 percent level. 
The estimation results as presented in table above did not seem to reveal significantly different results from the 
first estimation results. It was also empirically validated that compensation enhances corporate overall 
performance. Specifically we found that the independent variable (i.e. compensation strategy) has statistically 
significant positive effect on overall organizational performance. That is, a unit change in compensation, on the 
average, the probability of having improved/enhanced overall organizational performance increases by 0.415. 
 
6.0 Implications, Conclusion And Recommendations 
6.1 Implications of Research Findings 
The empirical results generated from the estimation process further authenticate and validate the theoretical 
relationships that exist between compensation and performance. Our regression results revealed that an 
effectively formulated and implemented compensation strategy has the potential beneficial effect of enhancing 
workers’ productivity in specific and the overall organizational productivity in general. 
6.2 Conclusions  
Compensation strategy is seen as one of the most important strategies in the human resource management 
function as it influences the productivity and growth of an organization. Hence, modern corporate organizations 
have deemed it imperative to incorporate effective compensation strategies for workers as part of their corporate 
goals and objectives. This is believed will shape a work force focused on strategic performance goals and 
capable of achieving them. 
This research work is also about compensation and productivity, or what used to be called pay and benefits. 
The total compensation solution is based on a rethinking of employee compensation and investment systems into 
an employee-driven system. Compensation thinkers have been raising questions about the structure of existing 
and often rigid pay systems for some time.  
Therefore, this study’s idea of compensation goes beyond pay alone to propose a reward and investment 
system- a group of variables that together encompass the varieties of kinds of compensation that today’s 
employees want from work. Pay is among them, of course (including both base pay, or salary, and one-time pay 
received in form of overtime or bonuses). But in addition to monetary rewards, contemporary employees want 
and are increasingly demanding reward diversity and reward choice. In today’s diverse, employers are finding 
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that employees want a range of different things from the work place. Employees will even exchange some level 
of base pay to get some of the other things they want. 
Conclusively, the significance of compensation cannot be overemphasized in a bid to attracting, retaining 
and motivating employees for improved organisational productivity. 
A major task from a human resource management and industrial relations perspective is to understand how 
to design and administer compensation policies that best meet the goals of employers and employees in the 
employment exchange. In this sense both the employers and the employees benefit and in general positively and 
significantly influence the overall corporate performance. 
6.3 Recommendations 
By all standards and with inference from the implications of the findings, good and well-designed compensation 
strategy, in fact, play a major role in providing for an integrated and coherent range of human resource 
management processes which are mutually supportive and contribute as a whole to improving organizational 
effectiveness. 
Consequently, management should design, formulate and implement compensation strategy objectively in 
order to enhance the attainment of overall organizational goals with a view of getting the best contributive and 
supportive effects from organizational workers. 
Finally, both management and workers should be made to understand the objectives contained in the 
compensation strategy so that unintended and subjective motives can be played down on while trying to enhance 
the common objective strategically. This, without doubt, will give room for good organizational performance.   
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Appendix 
Table 1: Frequency Distribution of Respondents Based on Their Company’s Compensation Strategy 
Compensation strategy Frequency Percentage 
Regular appraisal for promotion  15 10 
Gift/Bonuses for outstanding performance 05 O3 
Regular increases in wages and salaries 10 07 
Improved working environment 105 70 
More than one of the above 15 10 
Total  150 100 
 
Table 2: Summary of Respondent Responses 
S/N STATEMENT SA A I D SD 
1 Frequency Distribution of Respondents on How Their Company Has 
Implemented the Compensation Strategy 
17 40 30 13 00 
2 Frequency Distribution of Respondents according To Their Perception of 
Alternatives to Pay for Performance. 
73 27 00 00 00 
3 Frequency Distribution of Respondents According To the Cost Effectiveness 
of the Compensation Strategy. 
00 00 33 67 00 
4 Frequency Distribution of Respondents According To How The Compensation 
Has Enhanced Their Productivity. 
30 60 07 03 00 
5 Frequency Distribution of Respondents According To the Adequacy of the 
Compensation Strategy 
00 00 00 57 43 
Source: Authors’ Field Survey, 2011 
 
S/N STATEMENT YES NO 
1 Frequency Distribution of Respondents on the Existence of Formal Laws Guiding Labour 
Working Environment. 
100 00 
2 Frequency Distribution of Respondents on Their Company’s Conformity with the Formal 
Laws. 
00 100 
Source: Authors’ Field Survey, 2011 
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